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The Right of Free Association in a Social
Context
City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
I.

INTRODUCTION

The constitutional right of free association is not an absolute
guarantee of unfettered association between individuals. Recently,
the Supreme Court made this clear when it held in City of Dallas
v. Stanglin' that the freedom of association which inhereres in the
first amendment does not include a "generalized right of 'social as2
sociation' ....
The City of Dallas, the petitioner, had adopted an ordinance
restricting admission to certain dance halls, classified as Class E
dance halls,' to persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen." The respondent Stanglin, owner of the Twilight Skating
1. 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
2. Id. at 1595.
3. In addition to providing for Class E dance halls, the Dallas City Code, §j 14-1, 14-8
(1985-1986), provides for the licensing of Class A, B, C, and D dance halls. Class A, B, and C
halls vary in the number of days per week dancing is permitted and require persons under
17 years of age to be accompanied by a parent to gain admission. Class D dance halls are for
dance instruction. A license is not needed if a dance is held at a private residence, a governmentally-owned hall, a public or private school or university, a private club or a place owned
by a religious organization. Id. at 1593 n.1.
4. The ordinance, Section 14-8.1 of the Dallas City Code provides:
(a) No person under the age of 14 years or over the age of 18 years may enter a
Class E dance hall.
(b) A person commits an offense if he is over the age of 18 years and:
(1) enters a Class E dance hall; or
(2) for the purposes of gaining admittance into a Class E dance hall, he
falsely represents himself to be:
(A) of the age from 14 through 18 years;
(B) a licensee or an employee of the dance hall;
(C) a parent or guardian of a person inside the dance hall;
(D) a governmental employee in the performance of this duties.
(c) A licensee or an employee of a Class E dance hall commits an offense if he
knowingly allows a person to enter or remain on the premises of the dance hall
who is:
(1) under the age of 14 years; or
(2) over the age of 18 years.
(d) It is a defense to prosecution under Subsections (b)(1) and (c)(2) that the
person is:
(1) a licensee or employee of a dance hall;
(2) a parent or guardian of a person inside the dance hall; or
(3) a governmental employee in the performance of his duties.
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Rink in Dallas, Texas, had obtained a license for a Class E dance
hall and operated a dance hall in an area adjacent to his skating
rink. Unlike the dance hall section of his establishment, admission
into the skating area was not restricted by age.' Twilight did not
maintain a selective admission policy and over 1,000 customers
were admitted per night, most of whom were strangers to each
other.'
Stanglin sued the City of Dallas in the District Court of Dallas
County to enjoin enforcement of the age restrictions imposed by
the ordinance.' He contended that the ordinance impermissibly infringed upon the right of his fourteen to eighteen year old patrons'
to freely associate and also violated the teenagers' due process and
equal protection rights under both the United States and the
Texas Constitutions.6 The trial court, in upholding the regulation,
held that "the ordinance was rationally related to the city's interest in protecting the minors' safety and welfare."'
The Texas Court of Appeals, agreeing with Stanglin's position,10 struck the ordinance." The court held that the minors' first
amendment rights of association were infringed because the ordinance prohibited the teenagers from socializing with others outside
of their age bracket.2 Claiming that freedom of association includes association in a social context, the court stated that "the
right to freely associate is not limited to 'political' assemblies, but
includes 'those that pertain to the social, legal and economic benefit of our citizens.

' 13

When restricting such a fundamental right,

the court reasoned, the legislature must show a "compelling interest" and the restriction must be "accomplished by the least restricId. at 1593 n.2.
5. d. at 1592.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 1594.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. The Texas Court of Appeals granted Stanglin standing to sue on behalf of the
minors. The court based its decision on the fact that Stanglin is "among the vendors, and
those in like position, whom the courts uniformly have permitted 'to resist efforts at restricting their operations by acting as advocates for the rights of third parties who seek
access' to the services they provide ... ." Stanglin v. City of Dallas, 744 S.W.2d 165, 167
(Tex. Ct. App. 1987) (citing Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 678, 683-84
(1977)). As such, Stanglin is "entitled to assert those concomitant rights of third parties that
would be diluted or adversely affected should [his] constitutional challenge fail." Id.
11. Id. at 170.
12. Id. at 168-170.
13. Id. at 168 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965)).
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tive means" available." '
The Supreme Court, in an opinion delivered by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, reversed.18 The Chief Justice, in resolving the critical
issue, stated that the ordinance does not infringe upon any right of
social association because there is no right of social association
protected by the Constitution."6 He declared that while there is a
right of free association implicit in the first amendment," this
right is not absolute but only is recognized in certain limited circumstances.16 In addition, the Chief Justice determined that the
ordinance did not violate the equal protection guarantees of the
United States and Texas Constitutions.1 9
II.

ANALYSIS

A. Freedom of Association
In Roberts v. United States Jaycees20 the Supreme Court
14. Id.
15. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591 (1989).
16. Id. at 1595. A number of Fifth Circuit cases previously had recognized and protected the right to freely associate in a social setting. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Opelousas,
658 F.2d 1065 (5th Cir. 1981) (holding juvenile curfew ordinance violative of minors' associational rights); Aladdin's Castle, Inc. v. City of Mesquite, 630 F.2d 1029 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that city ordinance prohibiting minors less than seventeen years of age from entering
coin-operated amusement centers unconstitutionally invades minors' freedom of social association); Sawyer v. Sandstrom, 615 F.2d 311 (5th Cir. 1980) (holding that county ordinance
punishing mere association with an individual known to be in possession of or engaged in
the use of narcotics interferes with the personal liberty of individuals to associate with
whom they please).
17. Id. at 1594.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 1595-1597.
20. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). In Roberts, the United States Jaycees brought an action challenging a state statute forbidding sexual discrimination in public places. Specifically, they
challenged the requirement that females be admitted to their organization. Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority and disagreeing with the Jaycees, held that the male members were
not entitled to a constitutionally protected right of association. Id. See generally Note, Constitutional Law - Freedom of Association - Sex Discrimination- Associations and Societies
- Enforcement of the Minnesota Human Rights Act to Require the United States Jaycees
to Accept Women as Regular Members Does Not Violate Its Male Members' Freedom of
Association, and the Act is Neither Unconstitutionally Vague Nor Overbroad-Roberts v.
United States Jaycees, 104 S.Ct. 3244 (1984), 53 U. CIN. L. REV. 1173 (1984) (discussing
Roberts and its treatment of the right of free association). Cf. NewYork State Club Association, Inc. v. City of New York, 108 S.Ct. 2225 (1988) (holding that a city law prohibiting
discrimination by clubs which are not "distinctly private" is constitutional and cannot be
said to infringe upon the members' associational rights); Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that the application of a
California statute entitling all persons, regardless of sex, to "full and equal accommodations,
advantages, facilities, privileges, and services in all business establishments in the State"
does not interfere with the Rotary Club members' freedom of private association).
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specified the two situations where the Court has recognized that a
right to freely associate must be protected in order to ensure the
protection of other constitutional rights.2" The Court, in one line of
cases, has maintained that "freedom of association receives protection as a fundamental element of personal liberty" when individuals enter into and maintain intimate relations.2 The other line of
cases recognizes a right to freely associate for the purpose of engaging in the activities that the first amendment aims to protect-freedom of speech, freedom of petition, freedom of religion,
23
and freedom of assembly.
Protecting freedom of association for the purpose of entering
into and maintaining intimate human relationships is justified on
the grounds that people should be assured that they will be afforded "a substantial measure of sanctuary from unjustified inter' Without such a freedom, the Bill
ference by the State."24
of Rights
would be rendered meaningless.
Consistent with a need for a constitutionally protected freedom to associate in intimate human relationships, there must be a
corresponding constitutionally protected right to associate for expressive purposes. If not, the right to engage in activities protected
21. The Court in Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984), did not say
whether there exists a freedom of social association. However, the Court previously touched
on this issue in dicta in Gilmore v. City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556 (1974). In Gilmore,
Justice Blackmun, writing for the majority and assessing an ordinance segregating the city's
recreational facilities on the basis of race said: "It should be obvious that the exclusion of
any person or group ... from public facilities infringes upon the freedom of the individual
to associate as he chooses." Id. at 575. Therefore, it is arguable that the Gilmore dicta suggests that the Court impliedly recognizes such a right in a social context. Id.
22. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 618.
23. Id. at 617-618.
24. Id. at 618;
25. Some relationships which may be deserving of this sort of constitutional protection
are relationships which advance the creation of a family, marriage, childbirth, or cohabitation. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 619. Attributes which would typify these affiliations are relative
smallness of the group, a high degree of selectivity, and seclusion from others. Id. at 620.
Relationships without these characteristics, such as large business enterprises, are not entitled to avail themselves of a constitutionally protected freedom of association. Id. Between
these two extremes, a family-type relationship and a business enterprise, are a wide spectrum of human affiliations which may deserve lesser or greater constitutional protection depending on where they are placed on the spectrum. Id. By characterizing relationships based
on such objective criteria as size, selectivity, congeniality, and purpose, one can locate the
relationship on the spectrum and can determine whether constitutional protection is mandated. Id. See also Board of Directors of Rotary International v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481
U.S. 537 (1987) (holding that the relationships among Rotary Club members did not constitute the type of intimate relationships deserving of constitutional protection because the
club did not limit its size; maintained a policy of producing a membership comprised of "a
cross-section of the business and professional life of the community," which is an inclusive
not exclusive membership; and carried out their activities in full view of the public).
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by the first amendment would be a valueless or empty right.2
After consideration of the recognized and protected associational rights as illustrated in Roberts, Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected the proffered argument that a right of association exists for
the minors in attendance at the dance hall. Patrons of the dance
hall were not engaged in any form of intimate relationships.2 8 Contrary to the position taken by the Texas Court of Appeals, Chief
Justice Rehnquist determined that the patrons were not engaged
in any form of expressive activity which would be protected by the
first amendment.2 Because the teens were not involved in an activity which would advance their political, cultural, educational,
social, religious, or. economic expression, the Chief Justice reasoned, their "association" cannot be deemed as falling within the
realm of a constitutionally protected right. °
The Court, disagreeing with the court of appeals, definitively
stated that there existed no "generalized right of social association." 3' The Court claimed that its earlier assertion in Griswold v.
Connecticut 2 that "the right to freely associate is not limited to
'political' assemblies but includes those that 'pertain to the social,
legal, and economic benefit' of our citizens"3 3 was incorrectly interpreted by the court of appeals as granting a right to freely associate in a social setting. Chief Justice Rehnquist, in an effort to clarify, stated that the quoted language from Griswold merely extends
a right of expressive association "to groups organized to engage in
26. Roberts, 468 U.S. at 617-618. It is important to note that this right is not absolute.
The state can justify a restriction on the right by showing that there is a compelling state
interest, that there is no less restrictive means available, and that there is no suppression of
ideas. Id. at 623.
27. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1595 (1989).
28. Using the objective criteria as set forth in Roberts, the relationship between dance
hall patrons would be characterized as an affiliation closest to the business relationship end
of the spectrum. The size of the group was large (over 1,000 minors attended nightly), the
patrons were not.selectively admitted (other than by age and ability to pay the admittance.
fee), the admittance was not in furtherance of any unified goal or purpose, and among a
group of strangers there was surely a lack of the requisite congeniality. Id. at 1595.
29. Id.
30. Id. The proposition that dancing is an expressive activity that demands constitutional protection misapprehends the Supreme Court's use of the term "expressive activity."
The Court does not use the term to encompass any activity which may be expressive in
nature. Id. In almost any human activity, one can derive some form of expression. Id. The
Court is referring specifically to activities which further political, cultural, educational, social, religious, or economic beliefs and the dancing engaged in in the present case was not in
furtherance of any of these beliefs. Id. On the other hand, if dancing was the medium used
to express any one of the foregoing beliefs, the Court may have held differently.
31. Id.
32. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
33. City of Dallas, 109 S. Ct. at 1595 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483).
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speech that does not pertain directly to politics.""
B.

Rational Basis

After the Court concluded that the ordinance does not infringe
upon any constitutionally protected right, its only remaining task
was to determine, under the equal protection clause, whether the
city had a "rational basis" for enacting the regulation." When considering whether a challenged statute, ordinance, or regulation survives rational basis scrutiny," the Court first must determine
whether the governmental entity enacted the legislation to promote a legitimate public purpose. 7 If it finds that it did, the Court
will assess whether the legislation is a rational means to further
that legitimate end." Stanglin, while recognizing the validity of the city's objective
of separating the minors from the corrupting influences of older
teenagers, challenged the connection between the city's regulation
and that objective.3 He contended that the city could have
achieved its objective with alternative methods of regulation. However, contrary to his argument, the Court, when applying a tolerant
"rational basis" standard, will not strictly scrutinize a regulation."
Instead, the Court will engage in an extremely deferential analysis,
clothing the legislative action in a presumption of rationality.4' Ad34. City of Dallas, 109 S.Ct. at 1595.
35. Id.
36. Rational basis is the lowest form of scrutiny which a court applies when considering an equal protection challenge. See Ross, Legislative Enforcement of Equal Protection,
72 MINN. L. REv. 311 (1987). See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 16-2
(1988).
37. See Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968) (upholding statute
criminalizing the sale of obscene materials to minors under 17 years of age as a justifiable
means of promoting the state's interest in protecting the well-being of its youth). See also
Carey v. Population Services International, 431 U.S. 594 (1977) (holding that a New York
statute prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to persons under 16 years of age was an
unjustified regulation aimed at restricting minors' promiscuous sexual activity).
38. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, 455 U.S. 283 (1982) (considering whether
a local ordinance which required the chief of police to assess whether applicants for coinoperated arcades had connections with criminals was rationally related to the city's legitimate interest in maintaining law and order). See also Ginsberg v. State of New York, 390
U.S. 629 (1968) (holding that a statute prohibiting the sale of obscene materials to minors
had a rational relation to the objective of safeguarding minors from harm and was therefore
constitutionally valid).
39. City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 109 S. Ct. 1591, 1596 (1989).
40. The Court in Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970), states: "It is enough that
a solid foundation for the regulation can be found in the State's legitimate interest .... Id.
at 486.
41. Metropolitan Theatre Co. v. City of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69-70 (1930).
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hering to this practice, Chief Justice Rehnquist found that the
means chosen by the city to achieve its objective satisfied the "rational basis" test' because restricting older teenagers' admissions
into a dance hall is rationally related to the ultimate goal of
preventing older individuals from negatively influencing the
health, safety, and welfare of the minors.'
III.

CONCLUSION

In City of Dallas v.- Stanglin the Supreme Court held that
freedom of association, in a social context, is not protected by the
United States Constitution. Consequently, the Court applied the
most deferential form of judicial scrutiny, the rational basis test, to
the Dallas ordinance-which restricted admission to class E dance
halls to persons between the ages of fourteen and eighteen-and
found that the ordinance was a rational means of promoting the
city's legitimate purpose of protecting minors from the corrupting
influence of older teenagers.
Natalie Herlands*

42. City of Dallas, 109 S.Ct. at 1596.
43. In Prince v. Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944), a state statute
prohibiting minors under the age of twelve from selling magazines on the street was challenged as violative of the equal protection clause. Justice Rutledge, writing for the majority,
advanced the rationale that "[t]he state's authority over children's activities is broader than
over like actions of adults ....
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the
healthy, well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens, with all that
implies." Id. at 168. More recently, the Supreme Court in Belotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622
(1979), stated that "although children are generally protected by the same constitutional
guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults the State is entitled to adjust its
legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for concern ....
sympathy and . . . paternal attention." Id. at 635.
* J.D. Candidate, 1990, University of Miami School of Law.

Published by Institutional Repository, 1989

7

University of Miami Entertainment & Sports Law Review, Vol. 7, Iss. 1 [1989], Art. 7

http://repository.law.miami.edu/umeslr/vol7/iss1/7

8

